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Purdue University
On the basis of an interdependence analysis, it is proposed that commitment to a close relationship
is associated with cognitive interdependence—a mental state characterized by a pluralistic, collective
representation of the self-in-relationship. A cross-sectional survey study and a 2-wave longitudinal
study revealed that strong commitment to a romantic relationship is associated with greater spontane-
ous plural pronoun usage, greater perceived unity of self and partner, and greater reported relationship
centrality. Commitment and cognitive interdependence operate in a cycle of mutual influence, such
that earlier commitment predicts change over time in cognitive interdependence, and earlier cognitive
interdependence predicts change over time in commitment. Links between commitment and cognitive
interdependence were weak or nonsignificant for relationships among best friends, suggesting that
this phenomenon may be unique to romantic relationships.
Involvement in a close relationship can change individuals in
fundamental ways. For example, close involvement can produce
changes in everyday activity preferences, arising from attempts
to coordinate activities with those of a significant other (cf.
Berscheid, Snyder, & Omoto, 1989; Van Lange et al., 1997).
Close involvement can also change the ways in which we com-
municate; for instance, increasing commitment is associated
with enhanced tendencies to accommodate, or to diminish nega-
tive reciprocity during the course of interaction (cf. Gottman,
1979; Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991). Does
close involvement modify mental representations of the self or
change the manner in which we think about ourselves in relation
to our partners? The present work asserts that increasing rela-
tionship commitment is accompanied by a restructuring of self-
in-relationship mental representations, including tendencies to
perceive ourselves less as individuals and more as part of a
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pluralistic self-and-partner collective. We refer to these collec-
tive mental representations of the self-in-relationship as cogni-
tive interdependence.1
Several theoretical orientations provide broad frameworks in
which to understand the effects of closeness on mental represen-
tations of the self-in-relationship. For example, to understand
such issues, attachment theory proponents might turn to the
concept of working models, focusing on the childhood origins
of relationship-relevant cognition and affect (cf. Bowlby, 1969;
Hazan & Shaver, 1994). Proponents of an evolutionary-biologi-
cal orientation might address such issues by highlighting the
potential adaptive value of blending one's identity with that of
a close partner (cf. Kenrick & Trost, 1997). In contrast, social-
cognitive theorists might explore the internal structure of the
self-concept (cf. Baldwin, 1992; Fletcher & Fincham, 1991).
In the present work, we use interdependence theory constructs
(cf. Kelley, 1979; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) to understand self-
in-relationship mental representations, examining this phenome-
non by focusing on an outgrowth of interdependence theory, the
investment model of commitment processes (Rusbult, 1980a,
1983).
Interdependence Theory and the Investment Model
Interdependence theory describes the ways in which the struc-
ture of outcome interdependence shapes motivation and behavior
in dyads (Kelley, 1979; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). The concept
of dependence is a key component of the theory. Dependence
' This term previously has been used by other authors to refer to
assorted relationship phenomena. Most notably, Wegner and his col-
leagues have used the term in reference to the interdependent cognitions
that characterize the transactive memories of relationship partners (Weg-
ner, Giuliano, & Hertel, 1985; Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991).
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level describes the degree to which each of two interacting
individuals needs their relationship, or the extent to which each
individual's personal well-being rests on involvement in the
relationship. According to interdependence theory, dependence
is greater to the degree that a relationship provides good out-
comes and to the degree that the outcomes available in alterna-
tive relationships are poor. For example, John's dependence on
Mary is greater to the extent that he relies uniquely on Mary for
the fulfillment of his most important needs; John's dependence is
reduced to the extent that his needs could be gratified elsewhere.
The investment model extends interdependence propositions
in two respects (Rusbult, 1983). First, the model identifies three
bases of dependence. Like interdependence theory, the invest-
ment model suggests that dependence increases to the degree
that (a) satisfaction level is high, or the relationship gratifies the
individual's most important needs (e.g., the needs for intimacy,
sexuality, or companionship), and (b) quality of alternatives is
poor, or the individual's most important needs could not be
gratified independent of the relationship (e.g., by other romantic
partners, friends or family members, or on one's own). The
investment model further suggests that dependence increases to
the degree that investment size is high, or numerous important
resources become directly or indirectly linked to the relationship
(e.g., time and effort, joint possessions, shared friendship net-
work). John becomes increasingly dependent—that is, he
comes to need his relationship—to the extent that he wants to
be in his relationship with Mary (feels satisfied), is bound to
the relationship (has high investments), and has little choice
but to be in the relationship (has poor alternatives).
The investment model also extends interdependence proposi-
tions in a second respect, suggesting that dependence produces
the psychological experience of commitment. Commitment in-
cludes conative, cognitive, and affective components. The cona-
tive component of commitment is intent to persist—John feels
intrinsically motivated to continue his relationship with Mary.
The cognitive component is long-term orientation—John envi-
sions himself as involved in the relationship for the foreseeable
future and considers the implications of current actions for fu-
ture outcomes. The affective component is psychological attach-
ment—John experiences life in dyadic terms, such that his emo-
tional well-being is influenced by Mary and their relationship.
The three components of commitment are theoretically and em-
pirically discriminable but tend to cooccur, and collectively are
distinct from the three bases of dependence (Arriaga, Agnew, &
Rusbult, 1997; Rusbult, Martz, & Agnew, in press).
The empirical literature reveals good support for investment
model predictions. Numerous studies have demonstrated that
(a) commitment level is significantly associated with the bases
of dependence, being positively associated with satisfaction
level, negatively associated with quality of alternatives, and posi-
tively associated with investment size; (b) the three bases of
dependence collectively account for 40% to 80% of the variance
in commitment (e.g., Rusbult, 1983; Rusbult, Johnson, & Mor-
row, 1986; Simpson, 1987); and (c) each of the three bases of
dependence accounts for unique variance in commitment (e.g.,
Cox, Wexler, Rusbult, & Gaines, 1997; Rusbult, 1983; Rusbult
et al., in press). At the same time, the three bases of dependence
do not necessarily exhibit associations with commitment that
are equivalent in magnitude. For example, satisfaction is some-
times an especially powerful correlate of commitment (e.g., in
short-term or new involvements, where sentiment override is
potent; cf. Weiss, 1980), and satisfaction is sometimes largely
irrelevant to commitment (e.g., in abusive relationships; cf. Rus-
bult & Martz, 1995).
How does commitment differ from dependence? First, depen-
dence is a structural property whereas commitment is a subjec-
tive experience. Dependence is a structural state describing the
degree to which an individual needs a relationship. Individuals
may or may not be aware of their dependence. At critical mo-
ments, John may actively contemplate his dependence on Mary,
consciously reviewing the extent of his satisfaction, alternatives,
and investments. At other times, however, John's dependence
may remain largely implicit—he may not consciously consider
the extent of his need. In contrast, commitment is the subjective
state that dependent individuals experience on a daily basis. In
this sense, commitment can usefully be construed as the subjec-
tive sense of allegiance that is established with regard to the
source of one's structural dependence. Because John is depen-
dent on his relationship, he develops intentions to persist with
Mary, he foresees long-term involvement with Mary, and he
feels affectively linked to Mary and their relationship. It is the
psychological experience of commitment, rather than the struc-
tural state of dependence, that is argued to influence everyday
behavior in relationships.
Commitment also differs from dependence in a second re-
spect. Commitment is an emergent property of dependence, rep-
resenting more than the sum of the structural elements from
which it arises. Although commitment develops as a result of
high satisfaction, poor alternatives, and high investments, com-
mitment is more than a simple numerical summary of depen-
dence. The structural state of dependence does not necessarily
have direct implications for conative, cognitive, and affective
experiences such as intent to persist, long-term orientation, or
psychological attachment; the subjective experience of commit-
ment embodies these psychological elements. Thus, the compo-
nents of commitment extend beyond that which is predictable
based on the degree to which John wants to be in a relationship
(satisfaction), is bound to the relationship (investments), and
has no choice but to be in the relationship (alternatives). Indeed,
the empirical literature suggests that (a) commitment is the
direct mediator of persistence and other prorelationship behav-
iors, and (b) commitment accounts for unique variance in prore-
lationship behavior beyond the variance accounted for by satis-
faction, alternatives, and investments (e.g., Johnson & Rusbult,
1989; Rusbult, 1983; Van Lange et al., 1997).
Commitment, Relationship Maintenance Acts, and
Cognitive Interdependence
Strong commitment to a relationship is reliably associated
with voluntary continuance in the relationship (e.g., Bui, Pep-
lau, & Hill, 1996; Drigotas & Rusbult, 1992; Rusbult, 1983;
Rusbult et al., in press). Moreover, commitment is associated
with a variety of so-called relationship maintenance acts, includ-
ing (a) disparagement of alternatives, or tendencies to drive
away or derogate tempting alternative partners (Johnson & Rus-
bult, 1989; Simpson, Gangestad, & Lerma, 1990); (b) willing-
ness to sacrifice, or tendencies to forego desired behavioral
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options for the good of a relationship (Van Lange et al., 1997);
and (c) accommodative behavior, or tendencies to accommodate
rather than retaliate when a partner behaves poorly (Rusbult et
al., 1991). In short, committed individuals frequently are willing
to exert significant effort or endure great cost toward the goal
of maintaining their relationships.
How is it that committed individuals come to enact such
prorelationship behaviors? The interdependence theory distinc-
tion between the given situation and the effective situation pro-
vides a framework for understanding this process. The given
situation refers to each partner's immediate, personal well-being
in a specific situation, describing each person's "gut level,"
self-centered preferences. Clearly, people do not always pursue
their given preferences. Frequently, behavior is shaped by
broader concerns, including strategic considerations, long-term
goals, or desire to promote both one's own and a partner's
well-being. Movement away from given preferences results from
transformation of motivation, a process that leads individuals
to relinquish their immediate self-interest and act on the basis
of broader considerations. The effective situation refers to the
modified preferences resulting from the transformation process;
effective preferences directly guide behavior.
Transformation of motivation describes departures from
given-situation preferences, or movement away from desire to
maximize one's own immediate self-interest (referred to in in-
terdependence terminology as "MaxOwn"). Sometimes the
transformation process yields prorelationship motivational
shifts; for example, John may wish to maximize his partner's
outcomes ("MaxOther"), or he may wish to maximize his
own and Mary's joint outcomes (' 'MaxJoint''). Sometimes the
transformation process yields antirelationship shifts; for exam-
ple, John may wish to maximize the difference between his own
and Mary's outcomes (' 'MaxRel''). Interdependence theory as-
sumes that the character of the transformation process typically
is shaped by the internal processes accompanying an interper-
sonal event, for example, by the cognitive and affective concomi-
tants of commitment (cf. Kelley, 1984; Rusbult & Van Lange,
1996). Unfortunately, however, few studies have explicated the
role of internal events in the process of adaptation to interdepen-
dence structure, and knowledge of the mental concomitants of
commitment is very limited. The present work seeks to identify
an important internal concomitant of commitment—cognitive
interdependence.
We suggest that as individuals become increasingly commit-
ted to a relationship, they come to think of their partners as part
of the self and come to regard themselves as part of a collective
unit that includes the partner. Over time in a developing relation-
ship, John becomes increasingly committed to continuing his
involvement with Mary, foreseeing an extended future during
which his well-being will rest on Mary and their relationship.
Accordingly, increased commitment is likely to instigate more
frequent relationship-relevant cognitive activity, along with a
shift in the nature of personal identity and self-representation.
In keeping with the emergence of MaxOther and MaxJoint moti-
vations, the individual is likely to develop a relatively couple-
oriented identity and a relatively pluralistic representation of the
self-in-relationship. John no longer thinks of himself simply as
John but comes to regard himself as part of a collective John-
Mary unit. This pluralistic, collective mental representation of
the self-in-relationship is termed cognitive interdependence.
It is useful to construe cognitive interdependence as a habit
of thinking that supports prorelationship motivation and behav-
ior by increasing the accessibility of the partner and relationship.
That is, partner-oriented and relationship-oriented thoughts, or
thoughts relevant to MaxOther and MaxJoint motives, become
increasingly available bases for transformation of motivation.
Cognitive interdependence may be thought of as operating in
conjunction with commitment, in that commitment involves var-
ious components of the self-in-relationship: self intending to
persist in the relationship (conative self-in-relationship), self
oriented toward the long-term future of the relationship (future
self-in-relationship), and self feeling psychologically attached
to the relationship (emotional self-in-relationship).
The existing literature provides indirect support for the asser-
tion that cognitive interdependence characterizes committed re-
lationships. For example, actor-observer differences in attribu-
tion are attenuated for close partners in comparison with strang-
ers, such attenuation presumably occurring because the
distinction between self and partner becomes blurred (Sande,
Goethals, & Radloff, 1988). Similarly, individuals tend to reflect
others' successes when the other is close, but not when the other
is a stranger (Tesser, 1988). The concept of transactive memory
is also relevant to our cognitive interdependence construct.
Transactive memory is "a shared system for encoding, storing,
and retrieving information"—a system whereby close partners
make use of one another's memories as repositories for informa-
tion (Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991, p. 923; see also Wegner,
1986). The existence of interdependent memory systems, re-
flected experiences of success, and parallel patterns of self-
partner attribution is compatible with the notion that commit-
ment results in cognitive restructuring, including incorporation
of a close partner into the sense of self.
Our interdependence analysis of cognitive interdependence
is also compatible with the self-expansion model concept of
inclusion of other in the self (Aron & Aron, 1997). Indeed, the
Arons proposed that a close relationship is defined by the degree
of self-other merger, arguing that closeness exists to the extent
that individuals think and behave as though the partner is a
component of the self (e.g., Aron & Aron, 1986; Aron, Aron, &
Smollan, 1992; Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991). More gen-
erally, self-expansion theory and interdependence theory are par-
allel in many respects. Both theories suggest that evaluations of
a relationship rest on the gratification resulting from everyday
interaction, both theories emphasize the ways in which partners
become psychologically linked over the course of extended
involvement, and both theories argue that important human
needs may be fulfilled in the course of interaction with a close
partner. Self-expansion theory stresses one need in particular—
the need for self-expansion—whereas interdependence theory
proposes that a variety of needs may be gratified by close part-
ners (e.g., security needs, sexuality needs, emotional involve-
ment needs). Both self-expansion theory and the present work
propose that the process of increasing interdependence yields a
pluralistic, collective representation of the self-in-relationship.
The present work seeks to extend the literature on other-in-
the-self inclusion by explicitly linking the concept of cognitive
interdependence to the broader interdependence framework.
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Acitelli's broad concept of relationship awareness also shares
certain features with cognitive interdependence (Acitelli, 1988,
1992, 1993). Acitelli defined relationship awareness as "a per-
son's thinking about interaction patterns, comparisons, or con-
trasts between oneself and one's partner in a relationship. In-
cluded are thoughts about the couple or relationship as an en-
tity" (Acitelli, 1993, p. 151). As "the process of thinking in
relational terms" (Acitelli, 1992, p. 102), relationship aware-
ness involves "thinking about how two persons relate to each
other" (p. 103). Past research on relationship awareness in
marital relationships has shown that satisfaction is positively
associated with relationship talk (a behavioral manifestation
of relationship awareness; Acitelli, 1992). Consistent with the
process of relational thinking, cognitive interdependence repre-
sents a state in which couple members regard themselves as part
of a collective unit that includes the partner. Being cognitively
interdependent, or possessing a pluralistic, collective mental rep-
resentation of the self-in-relationship, can be regarded as one
important manifestation of relationship awareness.
Hypotheses Guiding the Present Research
We conducted two studies, a cross-sectional survey study
and a two-wave longitudinal study, to determine whether strong
commitment is associated with a relatively pluralistic, other-
inclusive cognitive representation of the self-in-relationship. To
address this question, it was necessary to identify valid methods
of measuring cognitive interdependence. Our work used three
operational definitions of this construct: (a) a linguistic analysis
of plural pronoun use in relationship-relevant cognitions, (b)
the Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) Scale (Aron et al.,
1992), and (c) a measure of reported centrality of relationship.
These measures were selected because they are psychometri-
cally diverse: The language measure provides a covert means of
tapping relationship-relevant thought structures, the IOS Scale is
a graphical measure that assesses how an individual mentally
perceives a relationship, and the centrality of relationship mea-
sure is a pencil-and-paper self-report of the degree to which a
relationship is an essential, highly central element of life. Cog-
nitive interdependence is operationally defined as possessing
relatively pluralistic relationship cognitions, perceiving other-in-
the-self inclusion, and regarding a relationship as particularly
central to the self. Collectively, these measures should psycho-
metrically triangulate on mental representations of the self-in-
relationship.
Linguistic Analysis of Relationship-Relevant Cognitions
Several researchers have attempted to link language use with
interpersonal processes. For example, the number of first-, sec-
ond-, and third-person singular and plural pronouns occurring
during natural interaction has been found to be associated with
empathic accuracy (Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia,
1990). In addition, the types of verbs used in open-ended de-
scriptions of self and others have been used to test the assertion
that individuals hold privileged information about the self
(McGuire&McGuire, 1986). Similarly, language use has been
analyzed in studies of attributional bias in relationships
(Fiedler, Semin, & Koppetsch, 1991), and researchers inter-
ested in prejudice and stereotyping have used linguistic mea-
sures to gain insight into the cognitive representation of out-
groups; for example, the words they and we have been used
to activate category-based affect (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993;
see also Hamilton, Gibbons, Stroessner, & Sherman, 1992;
Maass & Arcuri, 1992). Researchers have also made use of
spontaneous verbalization procedures to investigate self-veri-
fication processes, on the assumption that spontaneous verbal-
ization stands as "one means of laying bare the complex pro-
cesses that mediate people's choice of interaction partners"
(Swann, Stein-Serous si, & Giesler, 1992, p. 399). In parallel
fashion, our work examines language use in order to open a
"window to the mind," providing a covert and unobtrusive
sampling of mental structure. We reasoned that to the extent
that a partner is regarded as part of the self, the individual
should describe the relationship in more pluralistic terms (i.e.,
exhibit greater use of first-person plural personal and posses-
sive pronouns such as we, us, our, or ours). Accordingly, we
hypothesized that individuals who are more strongly commit-
ted will exhibit greater plural pronoun use in spontaneous
verbalizations about their relationships (Hypothesis 1).
Inclusion of Other in the Self
The Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) Scale was developed
on the assumption that closeness can be conceptualized as over-
lapping selves, and that the IOS Scale taps the individual's
"sense of being interconnected with another" (Aron et al.,
1992, p. 598). The IOS Scale is a graphical representation of
the self in relation to the partner, consisting of a series of Venn
diagrams with varying degrees of overlap. We propose that this
sense of interconnectedness—the tendency literally to perceive
the self as overlapping with the partner—provides evidence of
the state of cognitive interdependence. Accordingly, we hypothe-
sized that individuals who are more strongly committed to their
relationships will perceive the partner as more integral to the
self (Hypothesis 2) .
Centrality of Relationship
Individuals lead multifaceted lives. Close relationships com-
pete for time and energy with professional activities, with other
friendships and family relationships, with valued pastimes (e.g.,
following one's favorite sports team), and with the more mun-
dane events of everyday life (e.g., exercising). To the degree
that a relationship is an integral component of the self, the
relationship should be regarded as central to the overall scope of
life and as integral to what makes life important and meaningful.
Thus, the tendency to describe one's relationship as central can
be regarded as yet another manifestation of cognitive interdepen-
dence (cf. Lin & Rusbult, 1995; Rusbult et al., 1991). In addi-
tion to the covert language measure and the graphical IOS mea-
sure, we believed it was important to include an overt self-
report measure to capture the more conscious and accessible
manifestations of cognitive interdependence. Accordingly, we
predicted that individuals who are more committed to their rela-
tionships will report greater centrality of relationship (Hypothe-
sis 3) .
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Mediational Role of Commitment
Given that cognitive interdependence is represented as a con-
comitant of commitment—and given that commitment is as-
sumed to emerge as a consequence of increasing satisfaction,
declining alternatives, and increasing investments—we antici-
pated that commitment level will partially or wholly mediate
any associations of satisfaction, alternatives, and investments
with cognitive interdependence. That is, although satisfaction,
alternatives, and investments may exhibit simple links with cog-
nitive interdependence, when the association with commitment
is taken into consideration, simple links with the three bases of
dependence will be reduced or eliminated (Hypothesis 4) .
Study 1
Study 1 is a cross-sectional survey study that was designed
to examine the plausibility of our claim that commitment level
is positively associated with three indexes of cognitive interde-
pendence: plural pronoun usage, perceived unity of self and
partner, and reported centrality of relationship (Hypotheses 1,
2, and 3) . Rirthermore, this study sought to assess the media-
tional role of commitment in the associations of the bases of
dependence with cognitive interdependence (Hypothesis 4) . In
addition, Study 1 included a measure of social desirability, to
determine whether our findings were influenced by tendencies
toward socially desirable responding.
Method
Participants. Two hundred individuals (123 women, 77 men) in-
volved in a romantic relationship participated in the study in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for introductory psychology classes at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Participants were 20
years old on average; 89% were Caucasian, 9% were African American,
and 2% were Asian American or Native American. The median duration
of their relationships was 11 months.
Procedure. Tb maximize the odds of obtaining a diverse sample of
ongoing relationships (i.e., relationships of diverse duration and commit-
ment levels), study recruitment sheets included a nebulous title and
listed no requirements for participation (i.e., involvement in a romantic
relationship was not required). Participants took part in the study in
groups of 15 to 35 persons. They were asked to complete a questionnaire
concerning a current close relationship. The questionnaire tapped all
constructs described below, along with several additional personal dispo-
sitions and features of relationships. If participants were currently in-
volved in a romantic relationship, they were instructed to answer study
questions with respect to the current romantic partner; if they were not
currently involved, participants were instructed to answer the questions
in relation to their current best friend. The data from participants describ-
ing romantic relationships were included in the analyses reported below
(n = 200); the data from participants describing best friends (n = 142)
were not analyzed.2 After completing the questionnaire, participants were
fully debriefed and thanked for their assistance.
Instruments. Using an open-ended, spontaneous thought-listing pro-
cedure (cf. Brock, 1967; Greenwald, 1968), we asked participants to
record their thoughts about their current relationship. The directions for
the thought-listing task asked participants to "share some of your
thoughts concerning your relationship." Participants were asked to re-
cord "any thoughts you have. . . . They can be positive or negative.
. . . For each thought, we ask that you write a complete sentence.
Please use one line per thought. . . . \bu can write as many or as few
thoughts as you'd care to. Keep in mind that there are no right or wrong
answers. . . ."Tb help participants understand the task, four examples
were provided—two positive examples and two negative examples, of
which two included only plural pronouns (e.g., "We were made for one
another") and two included only singular pronouns (e.g., "Sometimes
I feel the need for more space''). The examples were counterbalanced
in two set orders: one order in which the first example was singular and
the last example was plural, and the other in which the first example
was plural and the last was singular. In order to maximize the odds that
each thought listed by participants would include a subject, and hence,
possibly a pronoun, participants were asked to write complete sentences.
The instructions were followed by 14 numbered spaces (two lines per
space) on which participants were to record their thoughts. After listing
their thoughts, participants were asked to rate the positivity versus nega-
tivity of each thought ( - 3 = extremely negative, 0 = neutral, 3 =
extremely positive). The questionnaire was self-paced, so participants
could spend as much time as they wished recording their thoughts (in
fact, participants spent no more than 15 min on this measure). No
information was provided about why these verbalizations were re-
quested; participants were not told that their thoughts would be coded
for plural pronoun usage. Each thought was later coded by two trained
judges. Thoughts were coded as including only plural pronouns (we,
us, our), only singular pronouns (I, me, mine), both plural and singular
pronouns (e.g., "I think our relationship is good"), or no personal
or possessive pronouns (e.g., "The relationship is good"). Interrater
reliability was good (K = .95). Coding disagreements were discussed
and correct codes were determined. Number of plural thoughts (i.e., the
number of thoughts that contained only plural pronouns) was used as
an indicator of cognitive interdependence.
The IOS Scale was also used to assess cognitive fusion of partner
with the self (Aron et al., 1992). The IOS Scale presents seven Venn
diagrams representing varying degrees of overlap; one circle is labeled
as representing the self, the other circle is labeled as representing the
other (or relationship partner). The respondent is asked to select the
diagram which ' 'best describes'' the relationship. Diagram choices range
from completely separate, nonoverlapping circles (1) to nearly complete
overlap (7). The IOS Scale was used as a second indicator of cognitive
interdependence.
Centrality of relationship was measured with four self-report items:
(a) "In comparison to other parts of your life (e.g., work, family,
friends, religion), how central is your relationship with your partner?";
(b) "How much time do you spend thinking about your relationship
with your partner?"; (c) "Among the things that give your life meaning,
how important is your relationship with your partner?"; and(d) "Com-
pared to other aspects of your life, to what degree do events in your
2 We did not perform parallel analyses of (his best friend sample for
two reasons. First, the best friends sample suffers a selection bias in
that this group of participants was asked to describe the best friendship
solely because they were not currently involved in a romantic relation-
ship. Thus, this group of participants may be qualitatively different from
our romantic relationships sample. Second, and more important, many
questionnaire items were not well-suited for measuring key constructs
in nonromantic relationships, thus limiting direct comparisons of the
two types of relationships. Bor example, in measuring the investment
model constructs, all respondents were asked "How likely is it that you
will date someone other than your partner within the next year?" Simi-
larly, all respondents were asked' 'How much do you love your partner?"
Clearly these items make Httle sense for people who are responding
about a best friend (in fact, most of the best friend respondents left
these items unanswered or replied with a question mark). The method
used in Study 2 resolves the problems concerning sampling and question
wording and allows for an examination of cognitive interdependence in
friendships.
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relationship affect your overall feelings of life satisfaction?'' Each item
was answered on a 9-point response scale (0 = other things are of some
importance, 8 = nothing else is of any importance). Interitem reliability
for the four items was good (a - .82), so an averaged measure of
centrality of relationship was computed as a third indicator of cognitive
interdependence.
Participants also answered questions concerning commitment level
and the three bases of dependence: satisfaction level, quality of alterna-
tives, and investment size. These items were drawn from previous re-
search concerning the investment model (Rusbult, 1983; Rusbult et al.,
1991). After conducting initial factor analyses to isolate items that exhib-
ited minimal construct overlap, we selected three items to measure each
investment model construct (all measured on a 9-point scale; 0 = not
at all committed, 8 = completely committed). For commitment level,
we used the following three items: (a) "For how much longer do you
want your relationship to last?"; (b) "Do you feel committed to main-
taining your relationship with your partner?"; and (c) "Do you feel
attached to your relationship with your partner (like you're "linked"
to your partner, whether or not you're happy with the relationship)?"
(a = .80). To measure satisfaction level, we used the following items:
(a) "All things considered, to what degree do you feel satisfied with
your relationship?"; (b) "Taking into account all of the qualities that
are most important to you, how does your relationship compare to other
people's?"; and (c) "All things considered, how does your relationship
compare to your ideal?" (a = .87). For quality of alternatives, we used
the following three items: (a) "All things considered, how attractive
are the people other than your partner with whom you could become
involved?"; (b) "If you weren't dating your current partner, would you
do okay—would you find another appealing person to date?"; and (c)
"How do your alternatives (dating another, spending time alone, etc.)
compare to your relationship with your partner?" (a = .64). Finally,
to measure investment size, we used the following items: (a) "Have
you put things into your relationship that you would in some sense lose
if the relationship were to end (e.g., time spent together, secrets disclosed
to one another)?"; (b) "Are there special activities associated with
your relationship that you would in some sense lose (or they'd be
more difficult) if the relationship were to end (e.g., shared friends,
childrearing, recreational activities, j ob ) " ; and (c) "How much have
you got invested in your relationship—things that you've put into it,
things that are tied to it, activities that are connected to it, etc.?" (a =
.75). Given that these sets of items exhibited acceptable interitem relia-
bility, an averaged measure of each construct was computed for each
participant.
To determine whether any constructs were influenced by the tendency
to respond in a socially desirable manner, we also included in the ques-
tionnaire a 12-item version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability
Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; a = .51). The reliability of this
instrument was lower than would be ideal but was judged to be accept-
able given that this instrument has frequently been used in previous
research. Moreover, the present version of the instrument has been shown
to exhibit good test-retest reliability (Van Lange et al., 1997).
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics. In the relationship-relevant thought-
listing task, participants generated between seven and eight
thoughts on average (M = 7.52). Plural thoughts represented
slightly more than one third of all verbalizations (Ms = 2.62
plural, 4.08 singular, 0.57 both plural and singular, 0.22 no
pronoun). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to
determine whether the order of the examples provided for the
thought-listing task exerted any impact on the obtained data;
this analysis revealed that order did not influence number of
plural thoughts, F ( l , 197) = 0.93, ns. A principal-components
analysis of the three indexes of cognitive interdependence—
number of plural thoughts, inclusion of other in the self, and
centrality of relationship—revealed a single factor underlying
these measures (eigenvalue - 1.71), accounting for 57% of the
total variance. Accordingly, we used the derived factor score to
develop a single measure from the three separate indexes. This
measure is termed total cognitive interdependence (Gorsuch,
1983).3
Correlational analyses. Table 1 presents simple correla-
tions among the measures of cognitive interdependence and
commitment level. In further support of the assertion that num-
ber of plural thoughts, inclusion of other in the self, and cen-
trality of relationship tap a single latent construct, number of
plural thoughts was positively correlated with both inclusion of
other in the self and centrality of relationship; in addition, inclu-
sion of other in the self was positively correlated with centrality
of relationship. Of primary relevance to the present investiga-
tion, commitment level was significantly and positively corre-
lated with total cognitive interdependence and with all three
indexes of cognitive interdependence.4 No variables were sig-
nificantly correlated with the measure of socially desirable re-
sponse tendencies.5
Commitment as mediator of concurrent cognitive interdepen-
dence. Given that cognitive interdependence is assumed to be
a concomitant of commitment—and given that commitment is
3 From the relationship-relevant thought-listing task, we also created
measures of proportion of positive thoughts and proportion of negative
thoughts. In support of the construct validity of our measures of cognitive
interdependence, number of plural thoughts, inclusion of other in the
self, and centrality of relationship were positively correlated with pro-
portion of positive thoughts (rs = .27, .36, and .36, all ps < .01) and
were negatively correlated with proportion of negative thoughts (rs =
—.23, —.30, and —.34, all ps < .01). Also, commitment level was
positively correlated with proportion of positive thoughts (r = .39) and
was negatively correlated with proportion of negative thoughts (r =
- .40, allps < .01).
4 In addition to analyses on number of plural thoughts, we also per-
formed analyses using a measure of proportion of plural thoughts (num-
ber of plural thoughts/number of total thoughts) and obtained similar
correlational results: .15 association with commitment level, .25 with
IOS, and .15 with relationship centrality (all ps < .05). In addition,
commitment was positively correlated with the total number of thoughts
listed (r = .15, p < .05) and was negatively correlated with the number
of no-pronoun thoughts (r - - . 2 3 , p < .05).
! We also performed analyses of variance to determine whether mean
levels of the Table 1 variables differed for women and men. Three
significant sex differences were observed: In comparison with men,
women exhibited greater number of plural thoughts (Ms = 2.14 vs.
1.91), F ( l , 198) = 4.95, p < .05; centrality of relationship (Ms =
4.93 vs. 5.34), F ( l , 199) = 4.13, p < .05; and commitment level {Ms
= 5.43 vs. 6.42), F ( l , 196) = 13.20, p < .01. It is important to note
that the correlational analyses displayed in Table I were calculated
separately for women and men. Comparisons of the strength of these
paired correlations revealed that no correlations differed significantly
as a function of participant sex. Thus, sex of participant does not appear
to have exerted substantively meaningful effects on the obtained findings.
In addition, the correlational analyses were calculated separately for the
two order conditions in the relationship-relevant thought-listing task. No
correlations differed significantly as a function of order (one pair dif-
fered marginally). Thus, order of examples does not appear to have
exerted substantively meaningful effects on the findings.
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Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among the Cognitive Interdependence
































1. Total cognitive interdependence
2. Number plural thoughts
3. Inclusion of Other in the Self
4. Centrality of relationship
5. Commitment level
*p < .05. **p < .01.
assumed to emerge as a consequence of increasing satisfaction,
declining alternatives, and increasing investments—Hypothesis
4 predicted that commitment level would partially or wholly
mediate any associations of satisfaction, alternatives, and invest-
ments with cognitive interdependence. That is, we anticipated
that although satisfaction, alternatives, and investments might
exhibit simple links with cognitive interdependence, when the
association with commitment is taken into consideration, links
with the three bases of dependence should be reduced or elimi-
nated. Tb test Hypothesis 4, we performed mediational analyses
(cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986), along with accompanying model
comparison tests (Cramer, 1972).
To test for mediation, we proceeded in four steps. First, the
presumed distal causes (i.e., the three bases of dependence:
satisfaction, alternatives, and investments) were found to be
significantly associated with the presumed mediator, commit-
ment (R2 = .45, p < .01). Second, the presumed mediator,
commitment, was found to be significantly associated with the
criterion, total cognitive interdependence (R2 = .43, p < .01)
and with all three indexes of cognitive interdependence (see
Table 1 and Table 2, Model 1). Third, we tested an unmediated
multiple regression model in which total cognitive interdepen-
dence was regressed simultaneously onto the three bases of
Table 2






































Note, p = standardized regression coefficient.
**p < .01.
dependence. The total variance accounted for by this three-
variable unmediated model was substantial (R2 — .45, p < .01;
see Model 2 in Table 2) . Finally, we tested a mediated multiple
regression model in which total cognitive interdependence was
regressed simultaneously onto the three bases of dependence
plus commitment (R2 = .51, p < .01; see Model 3 in Table 2) .
Results from these analyses indicate that the total amount of
variance in total cognitive interdependence accounted for by
the three bases of dependence was markedly reduced, but not
eliminated, in the presence of commitment (partial R2 for the
bases of dependence = .08), Fm(3, 187) = 10.40, p < .01.
Parallel analyses and model comparisons were performed for
the three individual indexes of cognitive interdependence. These
analyses revealed similar findings. Comparisons of unmediated
three-variable with mediated four-variable models revealed that
the total amount of variance accounted for by the three bases
of dependence was markedly reduced but not eliminated in pre-
dicting number of plural thoughts (partial R2 = .05 for the bases
of dependence), Fdi,T(3, 191) = 3.84, p < .01, inclusion of
other in the self (partial R2 = .08), Fdiff(3, 191) = 8.05, p <
.01, and centrality of relationship (partial R2 = .05), Fdiff(3,
191) = 5.17, p < .01. Thus, in predicting concurrent cognitive
interdependence, satisfaction, alternatives, and investments con-
tribute significant unique variance beyond the variance ac-
counted for by commitment. Commitment only partially medi-
ated the associations of the bases of dependence with cognitive
interdependence.
Overall, the results of Study 1 demonstrate that commitment
to a romantic relationship is associated with several indexes of
cognitive interdependence. The stronger the individual's re-
ported experience of commitment, the greater is the tendency
to think about the relationship in a pluralistic, other-inclusive
manner, as reflected in the spontaneous use of plural pronouns
to describe the relationship (Hypothesis 1). In addition, greater
commitment was associated with greater overlap in mental rep-
resentations of the self and the partner (Hypothesis 2) . This
finding is consistent with research reported by Aron et al.
(1992), in which commitment was found to correlate strongly
with the IOS (r = .54 for wives and .51 for husbands). Commit-
ment level was also associated with tendencies to regard the
relationship as a relatively central component of that which is
important in life (Hypothesis 3). These findings do not appear
to have been influenced by individuals' tendencies to describe
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themselves in a socially desirable manner; no study variables
were associated with tendencies toward socially desirable re-
sponding. Finally, we found that commitment partially, but not
fully, mediated the association of the bases of dependence with
cognitive interdependence (partially confirming Hypothesis 4) .
Study 2
Study 2 was conducted to examine the robustness and gener-
alizability of the Study 1 findings. Studies 1 and 2 differed in
two primary respects. First, half of the participants in Study 2
were randomly assigned to a condition that involved asking
them to describe a romantic relationship, and half were asked
to describe a best friendship. The friendship data were obtained
to ascertain whether cognitive interdependence is a concomitant
of both romantic commitment and friendship commitment. Pre-
vious research has demonstrated that the associations of the
bases of dependence with commitment generally are significant
for both romantic relationships and friendships, although these
effects tend to be stronger in romantic relationships (e.g., Rus-
bult, 1980b; Lin & Rusbult, 1995). Moreover, given that roman-
tic relationships tend to be closer and more exclusive than friend-
ships, it seems plausible that the association of commitment
with cognitive interdependence might be stronger in romantic
relationships than in friendships. However, we did not advance
a priori predictions in this regard—the analyses of best friend
relationships were performed for exploratory purposes.
Second, in Study 2, we obtained data at two points in time
in order to demonstrate that the cross-sectional findings ob-
served in Study 1 were not merely the product of transitory
mood states or self-report bias (e.g., self-presentation concerns
or desire to appear consistent). Longitudinal designs make it
less plausible that mood state accounts for links between Time
1 and Time 2 variables, particularly if one makes the reasonable
assumption that there is considerable day-to-day variation in
mood. Whereas in cross-sectional designs it is possible that
mood states account for some links (e.g., a positive mood might
increase overall relationship-enhancing judgments), this type of
spurious association becomes less likely with a longitudinal
design. We anticipated that the associations among variables
predicted in Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 would be evident not only
in concurrent analyses, but also in lagged analyses.
The design of Study 2 also allowed us to examine possible
reciprocal associations among variables. Previously we sug-
gested that as individuals become increasingly dependent on
their relationships, the psychological experience of commitment
is strengthened. At the same time, individuals develop couple-
oriented identity and pluralistic representations of the self-in-
relationship, coming to regard themselves as part of a collective
unit that includes the partner. This mental concomitant of com-
mitment is assumed to play a role in the transformation of
motivation, instigating prorelationship motives and behavior by
increasing the accessibility of the partner and the relationship.
Given that key processes in ongoing relationships unfold over
extended periods of time, prorelationship acts are likely to exert
reciprocal effects on commitment and the bases of dependence.
For example, earlier investments may increase commitment,
which is accompanied by enhanced cognitive interdependence,
which in turn induces prorelationship acts such as willingness
to sacrifice, which in turn may affect perceived investment,
which in turn strengthens commitment, and so on, in a congenial
pattern of cyclical mutual growth. Given that cognitive interde-
pendence is represented as a concomitant of commitment, and
in light of our assumption that these variables operate in a
pattern of cyclical mutual growth, we hypothesized that (a)
earlier commitment level will be associated with change over
time in level of cognitive interdependence and (b) earlier cogni-
tive interdependence will be associated with change over time
in level of commitment (Hypotheses la, 2a, and 3a).
The longitudinal nature of Study 2 also allowed us to examine
the mediating role of commitment in predicting change over
time in cognitive interdependence. Hypothesis 4 predicted that
commitment level would partially or wholly mediate any associ-
ations of satisfaction, alternatives, and investments with cogni-
tive interdependence. Study 2 allowed us to examine this hypoth-
esis over time, to determine whether the links that the bases
of dependence might have with cognitive interdependence are
reduced or eliminated when the association with commitment
is taken into consideration and when earlier cognitive interde-
pendence is controlled (Hypothesis 4a).
Method
Participants and procedure. Seventy-six individuals participated in
the study as part of a psychology class exercise at Purdue University
(54 women, 22 men). Participants were 21 years old on average; 90%
were Caucasian, 4% were Asian American, 3% were African American,
and 3% were Hispanic. Participants completed questionnaires during
class time; if a participant needed additional time to complete the ques-
tionnaire, he or she was allowed to take the questionnaire home and
return it at the next class meeting.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the romantic relation-
ships condition or the best friends condition. In the romantic relation-
ships condition, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire
concerning a current romantic relationship; if they were not currently
involved they were asked to describe their most recent romantic relation-
ship (data from this latter group were not analyzed due to obvious
qualitative differences between current versus former romantic involve-
ments). In the best friends condition, participants were asked to complete
a parallel questionnaire concerning the best friend, defined as "someone
other than your current romantic relationship partner, even though you
may consider your boyfriend or girlfriend to be your best friend."
Romantic relationship data were obtained from 37 participants (ex-
cluding those who were not currently involved), and best friendship
data were obtained from 39 participants. The median duration of the
romantic relationships was 18 months, and the median duration of the
best friend relationships was 36 months. About 6 weeks after completing
Time 1 questionnaires, participants completed Time 2 questionnaires
with respect to the same relationship described at Time 1 (again, these
data were obtained during class time). After completing the Time 2
questionnaire, participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their
assistance.
Instruments. Our measures of cognitive interdependence largely
paralleled those obtained in Study 1. The open-ended thought-listing
procedure from Study 1 was again used in Study 2 to covertly assess
the number of plural thoughts. Given that no order effects were ob-
served for the Study 1 data, the examples provided in the Study 2
instructions were presented in a standard order. As in Study 1, after
listing their thoughts, participants were asked to rate the relative posi-
tivity or negativity of each thought. Each thought was later coded by
two trained undergraduate research assistants. Thoughts were coded
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as including only plural pronouns, only singular pronouns, both plural
and singular pronouns, or no personal or possessive pronouns. In-
terrater reliability was good (K = .98). Coding disagreements were
discussed and correct codes were determined. As in Study 1, the IOS
Scale was used to assess cognitive fusion of partner with the self.
Centrality of relationship was measured with four self-report items,
worded as appropriate for the romantic relationship and best friend
conditions (e.g., *'I spend a lot of time thinking about my relationship
with my partner [friend]"; 0 = do not agree at all, 8 = agree com-
pletely ). Interitem reliability for the four items was good (for romantic
relationships, Times 1 and 2, a = .88 and .92, respectively; for best
friends, Times 1 and 2, a = .75 and .87, respectively), so an averaged
measure of centrality of relationship was computed for both types of
relationships for both Time 1 and Time 2.
Participants also answered questions concerning commitment and the
three bases of dependence. In keeping with one of the goals of this
study, special efforts were made to construct friendship-specific invest-
ment model measures (see Footnote 2). l b that end, all of the items
described below substituted the word friend for partner and the word
friendship for relationship, in addition to other minor word changes in
order to make each item sensible in the context of friendships. Following
initial item analyses conducted to ensure maximum construct differentia-
tion, three to four items were selected to measure each construct (all
measured on a 9-point scale, with 0 = do not agree at all, 8 = agree
completely). Commitment level was measured with the following three
items: (a) " I want our relationship to last for a very long time," (b)
"I am committed to maintaining my relationship with my partner," and
(c) "I feel very attached to our relationship—very strongly linked to
my partner." For romantic relationships, Times 1 and 2, a = .97 and
.95, respectively; for best friends, Times 1 and 2, a — .79 and .84,
respectively. Satisfaction level was also measured with three items: (a)
"I feel satisfied with our relationship," (b) "My relationship is much
better than others' relationships," and (c) "My relationship is close to
ideal." For romantic relationships, Times 1 and 2, a — .87 and .91,
respectively; for best friends, Times I and 2, a = .84 and .86, respec-
tively. Quality of alternatives was measured with four items: (a) "If I
weren't dating my partner, I would do fine—I would find another appeal-
ing person to date," (b) "The people other than my partner with whom
I might become involved are very appealing," (c) "My alternatives to
our relationship are close to ideal (dating another person, spending time
with friends or on my own, etc.)," and (d) "My alternatives are attrac-
tive to me (dating another person, spending time with friends or on my
own, etc.). For romantic relationships, Times 1 and 2, a = .80 and .84,
respectively; for best friends, Times 1 and 2, a — .88 and .65, respec-
tively. Investment size was also measured with four items: (a) "I have
put a great deal into my relationship that I would lose if the relationship
were to end," (b) "Many aspects of my life have become linked to my
partner (recreational activities, etc.) and I would lose all of this if we
were to break up," (c) "My relationship with friends and family mem-
bers would be complicated if my partner and I were to break up (e.g.,
partner is friends with people I care about)," and (d) "Compared to
other people F know, I have invested a great deal in my relationship
with my partner" For romantic relationships. Times 1 and 2, a = .74
and .81, respectively; for best friends, Times 1 and 2, a = .53 and .71,
respectively. In general, each set of items exhibited acceptable interitem
reliability, so an averaged measure of each variable was computed for
Time 1 and Time 2.6 In light of the low reliability for the Time 1
investment size items in the best friends condition, an averaged measure
of this construct was not computed; instead, we used a single item
judged to best assess the construct (i.e., investment item " a " listed
above). Because of the absence of associations with socially desirable
response tendencies in Study 1, in Study 2 we did not administer an
instrument to measure this construct.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics. In the romantic relationships thought-
listing task, participants generated 8.46 thoughts on average at
Time 1 and 6.62 thoughts at Time 2. Plural thoughts represented
46% of all Time 1 verbalizations (Ms = 3.86 plural, 3.41 singu-
lar, 0.84 both plural and singular, 0.35 no pronoun) and repre-
sented 42% of all Time 2 verbalizations (Ms = 2.78 plural, 3.05
singular, 0.57 both plural and singular, 0.22 no pronoun). In
the best friends thought-listing task, participants generated 7.13
thoughts on average at Time 1 and 5.79 thoughts at Time 2.
Plural thoughts represented 56% of all Time 1 verbalizations
(Ms — 3.97 plural, 2.46 singular, 0.36 both plural and singular,
0.33 no pronoun), and represented 57% of all Time 2 verbaliza-
tions (Ms = 3.28 plural, 1.95 singular, 0.36 both plural and
singular, 0.21 no pronoun). A principal-components analysis of
the Time 1 indexes of cognitive interdependence—number of
plural thoughts, inclusion of other in the self, and centrality of
relationship—revealed a single factor underlying these mea-
sures for the romantic relationships sample (eigenvalue = 2.27),
accounting for 76% of the total variance. Similarly, analysis of
the Time 2 indexes revealed a single factor underlying the mea-
sures (eigenvalue = 1.96), accounting for 65% of the variance.
In contrast, a single reliable factor could not be derived for the
friendship sample at either time period (i.e., the three items did
not all load highly on a single factor). Accordingly, we used
the derived factor scores to develop Time 1 and Time 2 measures
of total cognitive interdependence for the romantic relationships
sample only.1
Concurrent correlational analyses. Table 3 presents syn-
chronous correlations among measures for both romantic rela-
tionships and friendships. For romantic relationships at Time 1
and Time 2, number of plural thoughts was positively correlated
6 In both studies, our commitment measure included one item that
referred explicitly to the sense of psychological attachment to a partner
(i.e., in Study 1, "Do you feel attached to your relationship with your
partner [like you're "linked" to your partner, whether or not you're
happy with the relationship]?"; in Study 2, " I feel very attached to our
relationship [ friendship] —very strongly linked to my partner
[ friend ].") It is conceivable that the observed associations of commit-
ment with cognitive interdependence are largely the result of associations
with this commitment-as-psychological-attachment item, which might
be considered as an alternative IOS or relationship centrality measure.
We recalculated all analyses for both studies using a composite measure
of commitment that excluded this item. No substantive differences
emerged using this attachment-purged measure of commitment.
7 From the relationship-relevant thought-listing task we also obtained
measures of proportion of positive thoughts and proportion of negative
thoughts. Consistent with the results of Study 1 (see Footnote 3), in
the romantic relationships sample, at both Times 1 and 2, number of
plural thoughts, inclusion of other in the self, and centrality of relation-
ship were positively correlated with proportion of positive thoughts
(Time 1 rs = .40, .51, and .58; Time 2 rs = .52, .57, and .43; all ps <
.01) and were negatively correlated with proportion of negative thoughts
(Time 1 rs = - .35 , - .50, and - .52 ; Time 2 rs - - .50, - .55 , and
- . 4 1 ; all ps < .05). Also, commitment level was positively correlated
with proportion of positive thoughts, and was negatively correlated with
proportion of negative thoughts (Time 1 rs = .72 and —.66; Time 2 rs
= .66 and —.66; all ps < .01). In the best friends sample, these effects
were not statistically significant.
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Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Measures Analyzed Separately for
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2. Number plural thoughts
3. Inclusion of Other in Self
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Note. Time 1 correlations are displayed below the diagonal; Time 2 correlations are above the diagonal.
•\ p < .10 (marginally significant). * p < .05. ** p < .01.
with inclusion of other in the self and centrality of relationship,
and inclusion of other in the self was positively correlated with
centrality of relationship (one effect was marginal at Time 2).
Consistent with Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, at Time 1 and Time 2,
commitment level was significantly positively correlated with
all three indexes of cognitive interdependence.8
Table 3 also presents synchronous correlations among all
measures for the best friends sample: As anticipated, at Time 1
and Time 2, inclusion of other in the self was positively corre-
lated with centrality of relationship; however, number of plural
thoughts was not significantly correlated with either inclusion
of other in the self or centrality of relationship. Commitment
was significantly correlated with inclusion of other in the self
at Time 1 and Time 2 and was significantly correlated with
centrality of relationship at Time 2; however, the remaining three
correlations of cognitive interdependence indexes with commit-
ment were nonsignificant.
Lagged correlational analyses. We also calculated lagged
correlations among all measures for both romantic relationships
and friendships. These data provide good support for the test-
retest reliability of our measures: For both romantic relation-
ships and friendships, the Time 1 measure of each construct
was significantly correlated with the Time 2 measure of that
construct—for number of plural thoughts (rs = .51 and .57),
inclusion of other in the self (.77 and .54), centrality of relation-
ship (.85 and .47), commitment level (.90 and .45), satisfaction
level (.81 and .43), quality of alternatives (.80 and .52), and
investment size (.78 and .58; all ps < .01). In addition, for
romantic relationships, the Time 1 and Time 2 measures of total
cognitive interdependence were strongly correlated (r = .86, p
< .01).
The lagged correlational analyses also revealed that in roman-
tic relationships, Time 1 commitment was significantly corre-
lated with Time 2 measures of number of plural thoughts, inclu-
sion of other in the self, and centrality of relationship (rs -
.40, .78, and .80); also, the Time 1 measures of cognitive inter-
dependence were significantly correlated with Time 2 commit-
ment level (rs = .53, .72, and .86; all ps < .05). However,
parallel lagged associations were nonsignificant in friendships
(rs ranged from .02 to .19, all ns).
Thus, synchronous and lagged correlational findings for ro-
mantic relationships generally were congruent with expecta-
tions, but findings for best friend relationships did not conform
to the same pattern: (a) the three indexes of cognitive interde-
pendence consistently were correlated with one another in ro-
mantic relationships (12 of 12 effects significant or marginal)
but not in friendships (2 of 12 effects significant); (b) the
three indexes of cognitive interdependence were consistently
correlated with commitment in romantic relationships (12 of
12 effects significant) but not in friendships (3 of 12 effects
significant); and (c) the three indexes of cognitive interdepen-
dence were consistently correlated with satisfaction, alterna-
tives, and investments in romantic relationships (36 of 36 effects
significant or marginal) but not in friendships (10 of 36 effects
8 In addition to analyses on number of plural thoughts, we also per-
formed analyses using a measure of proportion of plural thoughts (num-
ber of plural thoughts/number of total thoughts) and obtained similar
correlational results: At Time 1, .34 association with commitment level,
.32 with IOS, and .33 with relationship centrality (all ps < .05); At
Time 2, .35 association with commitment level (p < .05), .30 with IOS
(p < .05), and .29 with relationship centrality (p < .10). In addition,
commitment was found to be positively correlated with the total number
of thoughts listed (r = .33 at Time 1 and .32 at Time 2, both ps < .05)
and was negatively correlated with the number of no-pronoun thoughts
(r = - .39 at Time 1 and - .31 at Time 2, both ps < .05).
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significant or marginal). Comparisons of the strength of the
synchronous and lagged correlations (excluding the test-retest
correlations) revealed that 45 of 84 correlations were signifi-
cantly stronger in romantic relationships than in best friend
relationships.9
The correlational results of Study 2 demonstrate that commit-
ment to a romantic relationship is associated with several in-
dexes of cognitive interdependence, in both concurrent and
lagged analyses. The stronger the individual's reported experi-
ence of commitment to his or her romantic relationship, the
greater is the tendency to think about the relationship in a plural-
istic manner, as reflected in the spontaneous use of plural pro-
nouns to describe the relationship (Hypothesis 1). In addition,
greater romantic commitment was associated with greater over-
lap in mental representations of the self and the partner (Hypoth-
esis 2) . Moreover, romantic commitment was associated with
tendencies to regard the relationship as a relatively central com-
ponent of that which is important in life (Hypothesis 3). Such
effects were weak or nonsignificant for best friend relationships.
These findings suggest that the cognitive manifestations of com-
mitment characterizing romantic relationships by and large are
not evident (or are only weakly evident) in mental representa-
tions of best friend relationships. Accordingly, the remaining
Study 2 hypothesis tests were performed only for the romantic
relationship sample.
Predicting change over time in commitment and cognitive
interdependence. Given that cognitive interdependence is as-
sumed to be a concomitant of commitment—and in light of our
assumption that these variables operate in a pattern of reciprocal
influence—Hypotheses la, 2a, and 3a predicted that (a) Time
1 commitment level would be associated with change over time
in cognitive interdependence and (b) Time 1 cognitive interde-
pendence would be associated with change over time in commit-
ment. To test these predictions, we first regressed Time 2 total
cognitive interdependence onto Time 1 commitment and the
Time 1 measure of total cognitive interdependence (cf. Finkel,
1995; Plewis, 1985). This type of analysis examines change
over time in cognitive interdependence, predicting Time 2 levels
of the criterion while controlling for Time 1 levels of the
criterion.
The results of analyses predicting change in total cognitive
interdependence are summarized in Table 4 (see Model 1).
Not surprisingly, Time 2 total cognitive interdependence was
significantly predicted by Time 1 total cognitive interdepen-
dence. However, above and beyond that which would be ex-
pected on the basis of Time 1 total cognitive interdependence,
Time 1 commitment was significantly predictive of Time 2 total
cognitive interdependence; that is, earlier feelings of commit-
ment predicted change over time in degree of cognitive interde-
pendence. In addition to performing this analysis for total cogni-
tive interdependence, we performed parallel analyses for each of
the three indexes of cognitive interdependence. Parallel findings
were observed for the three individual indexes: Time 1 commit-
ment predicted significant change over time in inclusion of other
in the self (0 = .40, p < .01) and in centrality of relationship
(0 = .31,p < .05), and predicted marginally significant change
over time in number of plural thoughts (0 = .24, p < .11).
These findings provide good support for the claim that earlier
Table 4
Regression Analyses Predicting Change Over Time in
Cognitive Interdependence: Study 2 Romantic Relationships









Time 1 satisfaction level
Time 1 quality of
alternatives
Time 1 investment size
Model 3
Time 1 total cognitive
interdependence
Time 1 commitment level
Time 1 satisfaction level
Time 1 quality of
alternatives



























Note, fi = standardized regression coefficient.
*p<.05. **p<.01.
feelings of commitment are associated with change over time
in degree of cognitive interdependence.
To examine the possibility of reciprocal associations, we re-
gressed Time 2 commitment level onto Time 1 total cognitive
interdependence, controlling for Time 1 commitment level. Not
surprisingly, Time 2 commitment level was significantly pre-
dicted by Time 1 commitment level (0 = .68, p < .01). How-
ever, above and beyond that which would be expected on the
basis of Time 1 commitment, Time 1 total cognitive interdepen-
dence was significantly predictive of Time 2 commitment level
(0 = .29, p < .01), that is, earlier cognitive interdependence
predicted change over time in the psychological experience of
commitment. Parallel findings were observed for the three indi-
vidual indexes of cognitive interdependence: Change over time
in commitment was significantly predicted by Time 1 number
of plural thoughts and by Time 1 centrality of relationship (0s
= .20 and .31, both ps, < .03) and was marginally predicted
by Time 1 inclusion of other in the self (0 = .17, p < .09).
These findings demonstrate not only that (a) earlier commitment
is associated with change over time in level of cognitive interde-
9 We also performed analyses of variance to determine whether mean
levels of commitment or the cognitive interdependence variables within
either time period differed for romantic relationships and best friend
relationships. We observed two significant differences and one marginal
difference as a function of relationship type: In comparison to descrip-
tions of best friend relationships, descriptions of romantic relationships
exhibited greater centrality of relationship at bom Time 1 (Ms = 4.04
vs. 5.26), F( l , 73) = 10.07, p < .01, and Time 2 (Ms = 4.43 vs.
5.34), F( l , 73) = 5.01, p < .05, and marginally lower commitment
level at Time 2 (Ms = 6.92 vs. 6.20), F ( l , 74) = 3.58, p < .10.
950 AGNEW, VAN LANGE, RUSBULT, AND LANGSTON
pendence but also that (b) earlier cognitive interdependence is
associated with change over time in strength of commitment
(Hypotheses la, 2a, and 3a).
Commitment as mediator of change over time in cognitive
interdependence. Given that cognitive interdependence is as-
sumed to be a concomitant of commitment—and given that
commitment is assumed to emerge as a psychological conse-
quence of increasing satisfaction, declining alternatives, and in-
creasing investments—Hypothesis 4a predicted that commit-
ment level would partially or wholly mediate any associations
of satisfaction, alternatives, and investments with cognitive inter-
dependence, after taking into consideration earlier cognitive in-
terdependence. That is, we anticipated that although satisfaction,
alternatives, and investments might exhibit simple links with
cognitive interdependence, when the association with commit-
ment and earlier cognitive interdependence are taken into consid-
eration, links with the three bases of dependence should be
reduced or eliminated. To test Hypothesis 4a, we performed
mediation analyses of change, along with accompanying model
comparison tests.
As in Study 1, to test for mediation, we proceeded in four
steps. First, the presumed distal causes (i.e., the three bases of
dependence: Time 1 satisfaction, Time 1 alternatives, and Time
1 investments) were found to be significantly associated with
the presumed mediator, Time 1 commitment (R2 = .84, p <
.01). Second, the presumed mediator, Time 1 commitment, was
found to be significantly associated with the criterion, Time 2
total cognitive interdependence, controlling for Time 1 cognitive
interdependence (partial R2 = .09, p < .01; see Model 1 in
Table 4) and with all three Time 2 indexes of cognitive interde-
pendence (for number of plural thoughts, partial R2 = .16,/? <
.01; for inclusion of other in the self, partial/?2 = .12, p < .01;
for centrality of relationships, partial R2 = .10, p < .01). We
then tested an unmediated multiple regression model in which
Time 2 total cognitive interdependence was regressed simultane-
ously onto Time 1 total cognitive interdependence (so as to
examine change over time in the criterion), along with the three
Time 1 bases of dependence. The total variance accounted for
by this four-variable unmediated model was substantial (see
Model 2 in Table 4 ) . Finally, we tested a mediated multiple
regression model in which Time 2 total cognitive interdepen-
dence was regressed simultaneously onto Time 1 total cognitive
interdependence, the three Time 1 bases of dependence and Time
1 commitment (see Model 3 in Table 4) . Results from these
analyses indicated that the three Time 1 bases of dependence
accounted for virtually no variance in Time 2 total cognitive
interdependence in the presence of Time 1 commitment; partial
R2 for the bases of dependence = .01, Fdifr(3, 31) = 0.65, ns.
Thus, in predicting change in cognitive interdependence, the
bases of dependence (satisfaction, alternatives, and investments)
did not contribute significant unique variance beyond the vari-
ance accounted for by commitment.
Parallel change analyses and model comparisons were per-
formed for the three individual indexes of cognitive interdepen-
dence. These analyses revealed similar findings. Comparisons
of unmediated four-variable to mediated five-variable models
revealed that the three Time 1 bases of dependence did not
contribute a significant amount of variance when Time 1 com-
mitment was included in the model: for number of plural
thoughts, partial R2 = .06 for the bases of dependence, Faa(3t
31) = 0.98, ns; for inclusion of other in the self, partial R2 =
.05, Fdiff(3, 31) = 2.07, ns; and for centrality of relationship,
partial R2 = .02, Fm(3, 31) = 0.90, ns. Across these three
analyses, the coefficients for satisfaction, alternatives, and in-
vestments typically were nonsignificant: Only one of nine coef-
ficients was significant (in predicting inclusion of other in the
self, satisfaction 0 = .26, p < .05; all others ns). Thus, in
predicting change in cognitive interdependence, the three bases
of dependence did not contribute significant unique variance
beyond the variance accounted for by commitment. These find-
ings provide good support for Hypothesis 4a, which predicted
that commitment would mediate the associations of satisfaction,
alternatives, and investments with cognitive interdependence.
In light of the assumed reciprocal associations of commitment
with cognitive interdependence, it is also reasonable to test
whether cognitive interdependence mediates the associations of
the bases of dependence with commitment. Accordingly, we
performed analyses paralleling those reported above, regressing
Time 2 commitment onto Time 1 commitment, along with the
Time 1 measures of total cognitive interdependence, satisfaction,
alternatives, and investments. The results of these analyses gen-
erally were parallel to those reported above. In predicting Time
2 commitment, a model containing Time 1 commitment, the
three Time 1 bases of dependence, and Time I cognitive interde-
pendence did not account for significant variance beyond a
model containing only Time 1 commitment and Time 1 cognitive
interdependence: respective R2 = .843 vs. .841; partial R2 =
.002, for the bases of dependence, fdiff(3, 31) = 0.12, ns. Con-
sistent findings were obtained for the three indexes of cognitive
interdependence. Model comparison procedures to determine
whether Time 1 satisfaction, alternatives, and investments con-
tributed unique variance above and beyond the various Time 1
cognitive interdependence indexes in predicting Time 2 commit-
ment clearly indicated that earlier satisfaction, alternatives, and
investments did not contribute significant unique variance be-
yond the variance accounted for by earlier cognitive
interdependence.10
10 We performed additional analyses to determine whether commit-
ment mediated the associations of the three bases of dependence with
cognitive interdependence within Time 1 and within Time 2 (cross-
sectional mediational analyses), as well as in simple lagged analyses
(i.e., lagged mediational analyses, not controlling for the level of the
criterion at Time 1). Analyses for total cognitive interdependence and
the three separate indexes revealed parallel findings for both the Time
1 and Time 2 cross-sectional analyses: (a) the three bases of dependence
accounted for significant variation in commitment; (b) commitment was
significantly associated with cognitive interdependence; (c) in simulta-
neous, unmediated multiple regression models, the three bases of depen-
dence account for significant variation in cognitive interdependence; and
(d) in simultaneous, mediated multiple regression models (i.e., including
commitment), the three bases continued to account for significant varia-
tion in cognitive interdependence. Model comparison tests indicated that
the total amount of variance in cognitive interdependence accounted for
by the bases of dependence was markedly reduced but not eliminated
in the presence of commitment. Combined with the results from Study
1, these findings suggest that commitment only partially mediates the
associations of the bases of dependence with cognitive interdependence
in concurrent analyses.
In contrast, results from the lagged mediational analyses (i.e., not
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General Discussion
Two studies—a cross-sectional survey study and a two-wave
longitudinal study—yielded results that are congruent with an
interdependence analysis of commitment processes. For roman-
tic involvements, cognitive interdependence appears to increase
hand-in-hand with increases in commitment level. The more
romantically committed individuals become, the greater is the
tendency to think about the relationship in a pluralistic, other-
inclusive manner, as reflected in the spontaneous use of plural
pronouns to describe oneself and one's relationship (Hypothesis
1). In addition, the more romantically committed individuals
become, the more they come to regard themselves as blended
with the partner, as revealed in perceived overlap in mental
representations of self and partner (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore,
romantically committed individuals tend to regard their relation-
ships as relatively central to who they are and what their lives
are about, as an essential component of that which is important
and meaningful in life (Hypothesis.3).
It is important to note that the results of Study 2 demonstrate
that in romantic relationships, the effects of commitment and
cognitive interdependence are reciprocal: Earlier commitment
is significantly associated with increases over time in levels of
cognitive interdependence, and earlier cognitive interdependence
is significantly associated with increases over time in commit-
ment level (Hypotheses la, 2a, and 3a). We anticipated such
reciprocal causal associations, in that key processes in ongoing
involvements unfold over extended periods of time. For exam-
ple, earlier investments may increase commitment, which is
accompanied by enhanced cognitive interdependence, which in
turn induces prorelationship acts such as willingness to sacrifice,
which in turn may affect perceived investment, which in turn
strengthens commitment, and so on. Such cyclical patterns could
have considerable adaptive value in the context of a generally
healthy ongoing involvement. Although the field of social psy-
chology has tended to emphasize models of unidirectional cause
and effect, we believe that models of mutual cyclical influence
may be a more suitable means of understanding causal processes
in ongoing relationships.
In contrast to our findings for romantic relationships, for best
friend relationships, the link between cognitive interdependence
and commitment appears to be weak and inconsistent. These
divergent findings may have emerged for the reasons outlined in
controlling for the level of the criterion at Time 1) revealed that Time
1 commitment mediated the association of the three Time 1 bases of
dependence with the various indexes of Time 2 cognitive interdepen-
dence. In these analyses (a) the three Time 1 bases of dependence
accounted for significant variation in Time 1 commitment; (b) Time 1
commitment was significantly associated with Time 2 cognitive interde-
pendence; (c) in simultaneous, unmediated multiple regression models,
the three Time 1 bases of dependence account for significant variation
in Time 2 cognitive interdependence; and (d) in simultaneous, mediated
multiple regression models (i.e., including commitment), the three Time
1 bases did not account for significant variation in Time 2 cognitive
interdependence. These results, together with the Study 2 analyses re-
ported in the present article, suggest that commitment largely mediates
the associations of the bases of dependence with later cognitive interde-
pendence when the variables are assessed over time.
our earlier speculation regarding differences between romantic
involvements and friendships: It is possible that romantic rela-
tionships tend to be closer than friendships and that because of
the lower base rate of closeness in friendships, the emergence
of cognitive interdependence is rare or unreliable. Alternatively,
it is possible that cognitive interdependence plays a role (pre-
sumably, largely an unconscious role) in sustaining exclusivity.
That is, a pluralistic, collective representation of the self-in-
relationship may help committed individuals block or drive away
challenging alternatives who otherwise might threaten the stabil-
ity of a relationship. Given that exclusivity tends to be less
essential in friendships—even in ' 'best friendships" —the func-
tional need for an exclusivity-sustaining mechanism may be
considerably lower in friendships than in romantic relationships
(cf. Fehr, 1996). Finally, the reliable emergence of cognitive
interdependence in romantic relationships may result from the
prominence of sexuality in such involvements. It would not be
surprising if mental images of "we-ness," merging, and union
were more accessible in relationships wherein sexuality plays
a prominent role. These possible reasons for the differences
found between romantic relationships and friendships are specu-
lative and await examination in future research.
Beyond the above-noted findings, romantic commitment was
shown to be associated with several additional measures derived
from the spontaneous thought-listing data (see Footnotes 3, 4,
7, and 8 ): More committed individuals hold a greater proportion
of positive thoughts and fewer negative thoughts regarding their
relationships. These results presumably reflect tendencies to-
ward perceived superiority, or positive illusion (cf. Van Lange &
Rusbult, 1995; Martz et al., in press), a tendency that frequently
is measured using a thought-listing procedure comparing the
frequencies of positive and negative thoughts regarding one's
own and others' relationships. The present results complement
and extend prior findings, in that even in the absence of instruc-
tions to list positive and negative thoughts about relationships,
our open-ended measurement technique revealed that individuals
with strong commitment are prone to view their relationships
in a rosy, relationship-enhancing manner.
Romantic commitment was also positively correlated with
total number of relationship-relevant thoughts, and was nega-
tively correlated with number of no-pronoun thoughts. These
findings suggest that low levels of commitment may be accom-
panied by cognitive representations that are rather minimal and
impersonal. That is, on a continuum representing variations from
low to high cognitive interdependence, low interdependence may
be cognitively represented not so much in terms of low collectiv-
ism and low other-self fusion, but rather in terms of no repre-
sentation whatsoever. Low-commitment individuals may simply
not think about their relationships (i.e., they exhibit few rela-
tionship-relevant thoughts), and when they do think about their
relationships, they may do so in an impersonal manner that is
relatively divorced from both the self and the partner (i.e., they
exhibit numerous no-pronoun thoughts).
Although commitment level was significantly predictive of
all three indexes of cognitive interdependence, links with com-
mitment were weaker for plural pronoun usage than for inclu-
sion of other in the self and for centrality of relationship. We
believe that these less robust effects may be a function of the
subtle, covert measurement approach used to assess partici-
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pants' relationship-relevant cognitions. The instructions for this
indirect measure purposely do not lead participants to respond
in any particular manner or direction. Participants were not told
how their listed thoughts would be analyzed, and, importantly,
were not informed that their pronoun use would serve as a
central focus of our research. For these reasons, we would not
expect the statistical association with commitment to be as ro-
bust as that observed for the more direct measures of inclusion
of other in the self and centrality of relationship. In many re-
spects, it is remarkable—yet consistent with our theoretical
framework—that in two separate samples of romantic relation-
ships, this covert measure managed to significantly tap collective
cognitive representation of the self-in-relationship.
A series of multiple-regression analyses revealed that com-
mitment level at least partially mediates the relation of variations
in satisfaction, alternatives, and investments on cognitive inter-
dependence (Hypotheses 4 and 4a): In the Study 2 mediation
analyses examining lagged associations and change in cognitive
interdependence, such mediation was rather complete; in the
concurrent mediation analyses performed in Studies 1 and 2,
such mediation was partial (see Footnote 10). For the time
being, it seems most prudent to take these findings at face value,
concluding that the impact of the three bases of dependence—
satisfaction, alternatives, and investments—may not be entirely
subsumed by subjective commitment (particularly in concurrent
analyses). Although the experience of commitment appears to
exert rather broad effects on the course of developing relation-
ships, substantially mediating associations with the bases of
dependence, the actual structure of dependence may well exert
some direct impact on mental representations above and beyond
commitment per se. The existence of partial mediation in con-
current analyses but not in lagged analyses or analyses of change
may reflect the process of cyclical mutual growth described
earlier. Precisely when and why direct effects emerge remains
to be specified in future work.
It is appropriate to comment on some of the broader implica-
tions of the current work. Our model represents internal events
such as emotions, cognitive interpretations, and mental represen-
tations as part of the process of adaptation to existing structural
circumstances of interdependence. Specifically, we suggested
that cognitive interdependence may stand as a "habit of think-
ing" that helps to sustain relationships by facilitating acts of
relationship maintenance. How might this occur? First, the exis-
tence of cognitive interdependence among well-functioning cou-
ples may partially account for the tendency of nondistressed
couples (in comparison with distressed couples) to develop
benign interpretations of one another's actions, for example, to
regard couple problems as jointly rather than unilaterally caused
or to share responsibility for resolving dissatisfying incidents
(cf. Bradbury & Fincham, 1990). Moreover, cognitive interde-
pendence may enhance the capacity for resolving problems of
noncorrespondence in an affable manner, to yield long-term joint
benefit (cf. Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). That is, partner-oriented
and relationship-oriented thoughts, or thoughts relevant to Max-
Other and MaxJoint motives, become increasingly available
bases for transformation of motivation. Such an outcome would
parallel findings from the literature on social dilemmas, which
has demonstrated that collective, group identity promotes coop-
eration (cf. Brewer & Kramer, 1986). Moreover, as noted earlier,
partners may intentionally or inadvertently communicate cogni-
tive interdependence to others—for example, through the fre-
quent use of " w e " in everyday language—thereby protecting
the relationship from threat by discouraging approach by alter-
native partners. Thus, there are a variety of indirect means by
which cognitive interdependence might serve to protect and sus-
tain ongoing relationships. One possible practical implication
of this work would involve the development of cognitive interde-
pendence enhancement techniques for use in marital therapy
(e.g., "think in terms of we rather than / " ) .
Strengths and Limitations
Before closing, several limitations of the present research
should be noted. First, this work examined the dating relation-
ships and best friend relationships of college students. It is
notable that even in these relatively young relationships, varia-
tions in degree of cognitive interdependence were sufficiently
pronounced to reveal reliable links with romantic commitment.
However, future work should examine parallel effects in more
longstanding relationships. In addition, the present research did
not differentiate between same-sex and cross-sex best friend-
ships. In light of the absence of systematic associations among
the cognitive interdependence measures for the best friends sam-
ple in Study 2, it would be useful to determine whether cognitive
interdependence functions differentially in these two potentially
distinctive types of friendship.
It will also be important to determine whether cognitive inter-
dependence in fact is associated directly with prorelationship
behaviors such as accommodation and derogation of alterna-
tives. The current findings point to the need for more detailed
cognitive analyses of the ways in which high levels of commit-
ment change the way people interpret, process, store, and re-
trieve information about the self in relation to the current partner.
In addition to examining specific operationalizations of cogni-
tive interdependence (such as the prevalence of plural pronoun
use), future research might examine how people form attribu-
tions and organize memories of social events vis-a-vis the part-
ner. Wegner's work on transactive memory and Aron's reaction
time research on inclusion of other in the self are excellent
examples of this kind of work (Wegner et al., 1991; Aron et
al., 1991).
The methodological strengths of the current work should also
be noted. This research used a varied set of measurement tech-
niques, including spontaneous thoughts, a graphical measure,
and traditional pencil-and-paper self-report to examine the asso-
ciation between commitment and cognitive interdependence.
Study 2 revealed that these measures exhibit good test-retest
reliability. By using a variety of techniques, ranging from highly
covert to relatively overt, this work provides convincing evi-
dence of the existence of commitment-inspired cognitive re-
structuring. Moreover, in light of the fact that the single-item,
pictorial IOS Scale exhibited significant links with commitment,
the three bases of dependence, and the other two cognitive inter-
dependence measures, the current work provides further evi-
dence in support of the validity and utility of the IOS instrument.
As proposed by the authors of this instrument, the IOS Scale
indeed appears to tap the interconnectedness of self and other
(Aronetal . , 1992).
COGNITIVE INTERDEPENDENCE 953
Conclusions
The results of the present work demonstrate that strong com-
mitment is associated with cognitive interdependence, including
tendencies to think about the relationship in a pluralistic manner,
to perceive a high degree of overlap in mental representations
of self and partner, and to regard the relationship as a relatively
central component of that which is important in one's life. These
results are congruent with an interdependence analysis of com-
mitment processes, which represents internal events such as
emotions and cognitions as part of the process of adaptation to
existing circumstances of interdependence. To date, little re-
search has been conducted on the cognitive concomitants of
interdependence theory concepts. We believe that Hie present
findings demonstrate the utility of an interdependence analysis
of key processes in close relationships while providing a useful
integration of the close relationships and social cognition
literatures.
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